The world of
science and the public at large were both shocked and fascinated by the
announcement in the journal Nature by Ian Wilmut and his colleagues that they
had successfully cloned a sheep from a single cell of an adult sheep (Wilmut
1997). Scientists were in part surprised, because many had believed that after
the very early stage of embryo development at which differentiation of cell
function begins to take place, it would not be possible to achieve cloning of
an adult mammal by nuclear transfer. In this process, the nucleus from the cell
of an adult mammal is inserted into an ennucleated ovum, and the resulting
embryo develops following the complete genetic code of the mammal from which
the inserted nucleus was obtained. But some scientists and much of the public
were troubled or apparently even horrified at the prospect that if adult
mammals such as sheep could be cloned, then cloning of adult humans by the same
process would likely be possible as well.
Around the
world similar immediate condemnation was heard, as human cloning was called a
violation of human rights and human dignity. Even before Wilmut’s announcement,
human cloning had been made illegal in nearly all countries in Europe.
A few more
cautious voices were heard, both suggesting some possible benefits from the use
of human cloning in limited circumstances and questioning its too quick
prohibition, but they were a clear minority. In the popular media, nightmare
scenarios of laboratory mistakes resulting in monsters, the cloning of armies
of Hitlers, the exploitative use of cloning for totalitarian ends as in
Huxley’s Brave New World, and the murderous replicas of the film Blade Runner,
all fed the public controversy and uneasiness. A striking feature of these
early responses was that their strength and intensity seemed to far outrun the
arguments and reasons offered in support of them— they seemed often to be “gut
level” emotional reactions rather than considered reflections on the issues.
Such reactions should not be simply dismissed, both because they may point us
to important considerations otherwise missed and not easily articulated, and
because they often have a major impact on public policy. But the formation of
public policy should not ignore the moral reasons and arguments that bear on
the practice of human cloning— these must be articulated in E-4 order to
understand and inform people’s more immediate emotional responses. This paper
is an effort to articulate, and to evaluate critically, the main moral
considerations and arguments for and against human cloning. Though many
people’s religious beliefs inform their views on human cloning, and it is often
difficult to separate religious from secular positions, I shall restrict myself
to arguments and reasons that can be given a clear secular formulation and will
ignore explicitly religious positions and arguments pro or con. I shall also be
concerned principally with cloning by nuclear transfer, which permits cloning
of an adult, not cloning by embryo splitting, although some of the issues apply
to both (Cohen and Tomkin 1994).
Conclusion I begin by
noting that on each side of the issue there are two distinct kinds of moral
arguments brought forward. On the one hand, some opponents claim that human
cloning would violate fundamental moral or human rights, while some proponents
argue that its prohibition would violate such rights. On the other hand, both
opponents and proponents also cite the likely harms and benefits, both to
individuals and to society, of the practice. While moral and even human rights
need not be understood as absolute, that is, as morally requiring people to
respect them no matter how great the costs or bad consequences of doing so,
they do place moral restrictions on permissible actions that appeal to a mere
balance of benefits over harms.
